

Creating a Java Card applet

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Overview

1. ISO 7816







Overview

1. ISO 7816

2. APDUs





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- 1. ISO 7816
- 2. APDUs
- 3. Applet creation





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- 1. ISO 7816
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- 4. Terminal creation





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- 1. ISO 7816
- 2. APDUs
- 3. Applet creation
- 4. Terminal creation
- 5. Security protocol as FSM






- 1. ISO 7816
- 2. APDUs
- 3. Applet creation
- 4. Terminal creation
- 5. Security protocol as FSM
- 6. FSM refinements





ISO 7816

Several parts...





ISO 7816

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Several parts...

- Part 1: Physical characteristics
- Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts
- Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols
- Part 4: Interindustry commands for interchange
- 🔶 Part 5 . . . 10





ISO 7816

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Several parts...

Buy them at NEN: http://www.nen.nl





ISO 7816

- Several parts...
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- Buy them at NEN: http://www.nen.nl
- Or search for copies on the internet
 - We have found 1, 2, 3 and 4 so far
 - http://www.cardwerk.com/smartcards







Interindustry commands for interchange





University of Nijmegen Interindustry commands for interchange
 Application Protocol Data Unit







Interindustry commands for interchange

Application Protocol Data Unit

Command APDU

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Data	Le	





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Lc

Data

Application Protocol Data Unit

P2

Command APDU

INS

CLA

CLA: Class byte

P1

- INS: Instruction byte
- P1, P2: Parameters
- Lc: Length data block
- Le: Expected length response

Le



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Application Protocol Data Unit

Command APDU

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Data	Le



Data SW1 SW2





University of Nijmegen Interindustry commands for interchange

Application Protocol Data Unit

Command APDU

CLA	INS	P1	Р2	Lc	Data
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Data SW1 SW2

SW1, SW2: Status words



Le



APDUs




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Four cases: parsing upon body length L







Four cases: parsing upon body length L
 L = 0

▶ $L = 1, Le \in \{1, ..., 256\}$

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CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Data	Le	
							2







Four cases: parsing upon body length L
 L = 0

▶ $L = 1, Le \in \{1, ..., 256\}$

▶ $L = 1 + Lc, Lc \in \{1, ..., 255\}$

CLA	INS	P1	Р2	Lc	Data	Le	





- Four cases: parsing upon body length L
 L = 0
- ▶ $L = 1, Le \in \{1, ..., 256\}$
- ▶ $L = 1 + Lc, Lc \in \{1, ..., 255\}$
- ▶ $L = 2 + Lc, Lc \in \{1, ..., 255\}, Le \in \{1, ..., 256\}$

CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Data	Le	
	I						







- Four cases: parsing upon body length L
 L = 0
- ▶ $L = 1, Le \in \{1, ..., 256\}$
- ▶ $L = 1 + Lc, Lc \in \{1, ..., 255\}$
- ▶ $L = 2 + Lc, Lc \in \{1, ..., 255\}, Le \in \{1, ..., 256\}$
- Some cards can deal with *extended* lengths: $Lc \in \{1, \dots, 65535\}$ and $Le \in \{1, \dots, 65536\}$



Coding conventions

CLA, INS, P1, P2, SW1 and SW2 are defined in the general ISO 7816-4





Coding conventions

- CLA, INS, P1, P2, SW1 and SW2 are defined in the general ISO 7816-4
- or in the specific documentation of an application





Coding conventions

- CLA, INS, P1, P2, SW1 and SW2 are defined in the general ISO 7816-4
- or in the specific documentation of an application

SW1 SW2					
Process	ed		Process	aborted	
Normal	Warning		Execution		Checking
processing	processing		eri	ror	error
61XX 9000	62XX	63XX	64XX	65XX	67XX to 6FXX



Standard functions

University	INS	Function
of Nijmegen	A4	Select file
	BO	Read binary
	B2	Read records
	C0	Get response
	CA	Get Data
	D0	Write binary
	D2	Write record
	E2	Append record





Java Card API

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Object, Throwable, Exception,...





Java Card API

java.lang
Object, Throwable, Exception,...

javacard.framework ISO7816, APDU, Applet, JCSystem,...





Java Card API

java.lang
Object, Throwable, Exception,...

- javacard.framework ISO7816, APDU, Applet, JCSystem,...
- javacard.security KeyBuilder, RSAPrivateKey, CryptoException,...





Java Card API

java.lang
Object, Throwable, Exception,...

- javacard.framework ISO7816, APDU, Applet, JCSystem,...
- javacard.security KeyBuilder, RSAPrivateKey, CryptoException,...
- > javacardx.crypto
 Cipher





Start with Java file





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- Start with Java file
 - Compile into CLASS files using any Java compiler







- Start with Java file
- Compile into CLASS files using any Java compiler
- Convert into CAP file using Sun's converter





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- Start with Java file
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- The converter creates simultaneously an EXP file





Start with Java file



- Compile into CLASS files using any Java compiler
- Convert into CAP file using Sun's converter
- The converter creates simultaneously an EXP file
- CAP file verifier checks CAP file





Installation

- Start with Java file
- University of Nijmegen
- Compile into CLASS files using any Java compiler
- Convert into CAP file using Sun's converter
- The converter creates simultaneously an EXP file
- CAP file verifier checks CAP file
- Off card installation program and on card installer load the applet on the card





Example: PayApplet

- See PayApplet.java
 process
 - readBuffer
 - install





Terminal application

Less restrictions: no need to use Java Card





Terminal application

University of Nijmegen Less restrictions: no need to use Java Card
 C: use PC/SC API





Terminal application

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- Less restrictions: no need to use Java Card
- C: use PC/SC API
- Java: use OCF API





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Terminal application

- Less restrictions: no need to use Java Card
- C: use PC/SC API
- Java: use OCF API
 - which can be built on top of PC/SC API





Finite State Machines

How to get from an abstract security protocol...





Finite State Machines

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- How to get from an abstract security protocol...
- ...to a Java Card implementation?






Finite State Machines

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- How to get from an abstract security protocol...
- ...to a Java Card implementation?





Abstract security protocol







Abstract security protocol

Bilateral Key Exchange with public key

- 1. *A* → *B* : *A*, $\{N_a, A\}_{K_b}$ 2. *B* → *A* : $\{N_a, N_b, B, K\}_{K_a}$ 3. *A* → *B* : $\{N_b\}_K$
 - A and B: agents
 - N_a and N_b : their nonces (challenges)
- K_a and K_b : their public keys
- $\{\ldots\}_K$: data ... encrypted using key K





Abstract security protocol 2

Alternative description: finite state machines






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Abstract security protocol 2

Alternative description: finite state machines





Refinement - extending

Observation





Refinement - extending

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- Observation
 - Protocol describes how to agree on a session key





Refinement - extending

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- Observation
 - Protocol describes how to agree on a session key
 - It does not describe how to use this session key





Refinement - extending

- Observation
 - Protocol describes how to agree on a session key
 - It does not describe how to use this session key
- Decide how to deal with this in the implementation





Refinement - extending

- Observation
 - Protocol describes how to agree on a session key
 - It does not describe how to use this session key
- Decide how to deal with this in the implementation
- Note that the actual -quite trivial- choices made here are not the issue!






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Refinement - extending 2

Automata

O InitialState O InitialState Msg1! Msg1? Msg1Received Msg1Sent Msg2? Msg2! Msg2Received Msg2Sent Msg3! Msg3? Msg3Sent Msg3Received



Agent B - Card Applet




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Refinement - input enabling

Observation







Refinement - input enabling

University of Nijmegen Observation

Protocol only describes correct runs





Refinement - input enabling

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- Observation
 - Protocol only describes correct runs
 - It does not describe how to handle exceptional situations





Refinement - input enabling

- Observation
 - Protocol only describes correct runs
 - It does not describe how to handle exceptional situations
 - Unsolicited messages
 - Errors while processing expected messages
 - Failure of the communication channel





Refinement - input enabling

- Observation
 - Protocol only describes correct runs
 - It does not describe how to handle exceptional situations
 - Unsolicited messages
 - Errors while processing expected messages
 - Failure of the communication channel
- Decide how to react in these situations






Refinement - input enabling 2

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





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Refinement - input enabling 2

Automata








Refinement - input enabling 2

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Refinement - smart card tuning

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Refinement - smart card tuning

- Typical for smart cards
 - Initialization phase
 - Applet selection
 - Persistent or transient memory
 - Card tears
 - Command-response pairs





Refinement - smart card tuning

- Typical for smart cards
 - Initialization phase
 - Applet selection
 - Persistent or transient memory
 - Card tears
 - Command-response pairs
- Decide how to deal with these issues





Refinement - smart card tuning 2

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Initialization phase





Refinement - smart card tuning 2

- Initialization phase
 - Each card needs to be personalized before any BKE run
 - Its id
 - Its own private key
 - The public keys of all valid terminals





Refinement - smart card tuning 2

- Initialization phase
 - Each card needs to be personalized before any BKE run
 - Its id
 - Its own private key
 - The public keys of all valid terminals
 - Once personalized these settings cannot be modified






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
Refinement - smart card tuning 2

- Initialization phase
 - Each card needs to be personalized before any BKE run
 - Its id
 - Its own private key
 - The public keys of all valid terminals
 - Once personalized these settings cannot be modified



Agent B - Card Applet

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Refinement - smart card tuning 3



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Refinement - smart card tuning 3

- Applet selection
 - Multi application platform: Java Card applets need to be selected





Refinement - smart card tuning 3

- Applet selection
 - Multi application platform: Java Card applets need to be selected
 - Go to a different state based upon personalization flag





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Persistent or transient memory





Refinement - smart card tuning 4

Persistent or transient memory

- Persistent memory (EEPROM)
 - Card's id
 - Private and public keys
 - Personalization flag





Refinement - smart card tuning 4

Persistent or transient memory


- Persistent memory (EEPROM)
 - Card's id
 - Private and public keys
 - Personalization flag
- Transient memory (RAM)
 - Protocol state
 - Session key





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 What can the card do after a power failure?





University of Nijmegen Card tears
 What can the card do after a power failure?

Nothing!





Refinement - smart card tuning 5

Card tears

What can the card do after a power failure?

Nothing!

What can the card do after it is powered up again?





Refinement - smart card tuning 5

- Card tears
 - What can the card do after a power failure?
 - Nothing!
 - What can the card do after it is powered up again?
 - Automatically clean up all session information





Refinement - smart card tuning 6

Command-response pairs





University of Nijmegen Command-response pairs
 Master-slave relation





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- Command-response pairs
 - Master-slave relation
 - Master: terminal application, agent A
 - Slave: card applet, agent B





Refinement - smart card tuning 6

- Command-response pairs
 - Master-slave relation
 - Master: terminal application, agent A
 - Slave: card applet, agent B
 - All incoming messages from B need to be answered by A







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




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
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Coding








Coding

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Manual derivation of Java code for the applet








Coding

University of Nijmegen

Manual derivation of Java code for the applet



Are these intermediate steps safe with respect to security properties?

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References

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- [2] E. Hubbers, M. Oostdijk, and E. Poll. Implementing a formally verifiable security protocol in Java Card. In *Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing*, LNCS. Springer-Verlag, 2003. To appear.
- [3] ISO7816 Information technology Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) card with contacts

